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4Missions Depend on  
the Space Network
The SN provides critical and reliable 
communication support to NASA 
missions including the International 
Space Station, visiting vehicles, the 
Orion spacecraft, space science 
missions like Hubble Space 
Telescope, and Earth science 
missions such as Aqua, Aura and 
Terra. 
Furthermore, services are provided 
to commercial missions, such as 
ULA and SpaceX, and remote 
science from Antarctica. The SN 
supports a variety of customers with 
proficiency in excess of 99.97%.”
Space Segment:
A Constellation of Satellites
• The Space Network Space Segment is comprised of a constellation of Tracking and Data Relay Satellites in  
geosynchronous orbit.
• The three generations of satellites began launching in 1983 with the most recent launched August 2017.
o Four “legacy” first generation TDRSs that were built by TRW: TDRS-3, TDRS-5, TDRS-6 and TDRS-7.
o Three second generation and three third generation TDRSs, all of which are Boeing 601 spacecraft: TDRS-8 through
TDRS-13.
• Twelve TDRSs have successfully launched to date, with only two being retired.
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Ground Segment: A Global Network
• White Sands Ground Terminal and the Second TDRS Ground  
Terminal are the backbone of WSC, each with three main  
mission antennas and one S-band antenna.
• Supplemental ground terminals are located at the Guam Remote  
Site and the Blossom Point Remote Site (Blossom Point6, Md).
TDRS-8 flown from Guam Remote Site
Retired spacecraft  
are moved to  




Launched: June 20, 2000
• Oldest of the Boeing-built TDRSs and has been  
recently experiencing power subsystem  
challenges
• Activities are underway to identify strategies that
may be able to extend the serviceable life of the
spacecraft if further failures occur
• In parallel, preparations are underway to  
develop an End-of-Mission Plan in the event that  
the next failure is critical
o While the operations staff at WSC have  
experience in decommissioning TDRSs, TDRS-8  
will be the first Boeing TDRS to be retired. As  
such, it presents a number of unique technical  
and logistical challenges
• This briefing will focus on both the life extending
strategies and well as the EOM planning  
challenges
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• TDRS-8 has suffered at least 6 solar array circuit failures out of the 32 total circuits.
o Arrays are producing 20% less current than expected (accounting for normal degradation) after over 17  
years on orbit
o 2 circuits failed in 2012, two in 2016 and 2 more in 2017 for a total of six
o Should the spacecraft lose more than 5 additional circuits, NASA believes TDRS-8 will reach the point 
where deorbit is recommended
• Bus Voltage Limiter (BVL) units are experiencing module anomalies.
o The units use shunting to regulate bus voltage. The anomaly shunts a static amount of current with no
regulation.
o Anomalous signatures have been corrected by disabling a module on each solar wing. 2 of 6 BVL  
modules (one on each BVL) have been disabled to recover the parasitic shunts. There are two more  
anomalous BVL modules still in use.
o Require a long term strategy to mitigate risk of unregulated bus voltage and consequent harm to units.
• TDRS-8 battery has 4 underperforming cells.
o Analysis shows that the spacecraft can survive the loss of 2 more battery cells.
o Batteries are not an immediate concern at this time.
o BVL/Solar Array strategies may affect the life of battery due to increasing depth of discharge.







• Payload deactivation techniques have been developed and procedures created. These procedures  
provide operator instructions on selecting and shutting down individual or combinations of payload  
equipment.
o Validated using TDRS Spacecraft Emulator (TSE) simulations.
o Ensured that the proper sequencing of commanding is built into command stacks which were delivered to  
the operational system.
o Simulation data forwarded to Thermal Team to determine impacts to thermal profile.
• Simulators at WSC were determined to provide inadequate thermal simulations.
• NASA-based desktop thermal model provided greater fidelity simulations of the TDRS-8 thermal
profile.
o Additional simulations to be conducted as global heater operation is optimized to provide best power  
margin regained for each payload shutdown or payload combination.
Load Shedding & Thermal Management
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• In order to characterize the behavior of the TDRS-8 BVLs, top-off tests were implemented as partof
the TDRS Gen-II and Gen-III nominal operating posture.
o These tests are performed as the spacecraft exits eclipse and allow the engineer to quantify the level of  
shunting for each BVL module.
o These tests have also been added to the TDRS-9 through TDRS-13 nominal operating posture.
• If top off tests reveal a large anomalous shunting, disabling another BVL module may be required to
remain power positive.
• Mitigations under investigation in loss of BVL operations.
o Increase bus load with or without solar array offsets.
o Modified battery management plan requires charging battery to limit high bus voltage.
o Re-enabling failed BVL modules following safe hold.
o Power management posture containing autonomous or semi-autonomous load bus overvoltage detection  
& prevention response logic for solstice and eclipse seasons.
BVL Top-Off Tests
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• Solar Array Offset Testing Strategy has been developed to determinewhether  
off-pointing the arrays could be used as a power management technique if  
BVLs must be deactivated.
o The test characterized the power output by the arrays as a function of offset angle.
o The procedure for off-pointing the arrays was developed, simulated and reviewed as  
a joint effort between WSC and Sustaining Engineering.
• A modified version of the test was performed during an eclipse prior to
execution in full sun to reduce risk and validate the test procedure.
Solar Array Off-Pointing Strategy
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Test Description
• In full sunlight, one solar array was commanded to a pre-determined angle off of the sun line using
the solar wing bias algorithm.
o Maximum commanded offset angle was 85⁰, as the margin of error in the pointing algorithm is ±5⁰.
o Setting a limit of 85⁰ prevented the possibility of exposing the back side of the array to the sun.
• The other solar array was left in sun tracking mode.
• Once the offset angle was reached, the off-pointed wing was commanded back to thesun.
o The full duration of the slews out and back was validated during the eclipse test to be total of about 60  
minutes.
• During a separate test window, the other solar array underwent the same procedure while the
previously offset array remains in sun tracking mode.
Data Collected
• Characterization of power output by each array as a function of sun incidence angle.
• Comparative outputs of the two arrays.
Solar Array Off-Pointing Test
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Primary sources for TDRS-8 End of Mission Planning
• NASA Debris Management Documents
o NPR 8715.6B – NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris and Evaluating the Meteoroid  
and Orbital Debris Environments
o NASA-STD-8719.14A – Process for Limiting Orbital Debris
• TDRS Documents
o Deorbit Maneuver/Shutdown
o TDRS-1 and TDRS-4 EOM heritage
 Provides conceptual framework for F8 EOM activities
Moving to Supersync Orbit
• The target altitude will be an orbit with a perigee of 350 km above GEO and an eccentricity of  
0.003, or less. The calculated lowest perigee to meet requirements is 303 km aboveGEO.
Limitations & Considerations
Thruster Constraints
• 10 second burn duration – East/West thrusters
o Time constraint introduced after the failure of the E2  
thruster on TDRS-10.
o This constraint was implemented on other Boeing 601
satellites.
o Discussions have been taking place about relaxing this  
constraint.
o 30 minutes minimum between any continuous burn (> 2  
seconds).
• 50 second burn duration – North thruster pairs
o Physically constrained by Propellant Management Device  
(PMD).
o Constraint on time between burns (2 hours if depleted
sponge).
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Limitations & Considerations (cont.)
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Power Management Considerations
• Will vary depending on what failure/scenario ultimately leads to EOM.
o Must assume that any fault could ultimately be the cause of EOM.
Limited ground visibility window once supersync maneuvers begin.
• Constrains timeline for orbit raising maneuvers and final passivation activities.
• A significant amount of fuel depletion will likely need to occur prior to orbit raising.
1. Payload Off/TT&C Commanded to S-Band
o Straightforward methodology using established procedures.
2. Initial Fuel Depletion
o Currently plan to use north thruster burns, which may be time consuming.
o Several techniques are currently under consideration, including various thruster configurations as well as
propellant banking.
3. Super-Sync Maneuvers
o Current plan is to perform burns using the west thrusters (more that 100 burns may be needed).
o Other maneuver techniques under review, including tip-burn-tip and sun pointing maneuvers.
4. Final Fuel Depletion
o Will require a fuel depletion technique that accounts for the possibility of bubbles in the propellant that  
could cause thrust imbalances.
o Will likely be the most challenging phase of EOM.
Integrated End of Mission Plan (IEMP)
Development
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5. Initial Electrical & Power Subsystem (EPS) Passivation
o Power off all payload and thermal units and disable batter charging.
o Straightforward process utilizing established procedures.
6. ACS Passivation
o Power down gyros and Momentum Wheel Platform Assembly.
o Power off Earth Sensor Assemblies and Spacecraft Control  
Processors.
7. Final EPS & TT&C Passivation
o Power down Telemetry streams.
o Disable Commanding.






• Research, simulate, and test strategies to extend the serviceable life of TDRS-8 in the event that
additional power subsystem failures occur.
• Develop/refine emergency response procedures in anticipation of future power subsystem failures.
o Train spacecraft engineers and operators to execute contingency procedures in a simulator  
environment.
• Select fuel depletion and supersyncing methodologies and document these in the IEMP.
o Develop mature draft of IEMP.
• Continue collaboration with Boeing COSC to refine models and address major areas of concern.
Path Forward
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